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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that the literature on contemporary social movements is 
essentially circular, representing a political reductionism within which the analysis 
of these movements in terms of (individual, collective, societal) instrumental 
rationality appears both as a premise and as a conclusion. This in effect treats the 
theorist's own local form of rationality as universal, rather than taking the question 
of the modes of rationality operating in these contexts as an open question for 
research. By restricting the analytic and explanatory value of the social movement 
concept to the narrow field identified as relevant by this methodology, its common 
use for more wide-ranging analyses of the nature of contemporary social change is 
fatally undermined.  
This tension is strongest in authors representing an "identity paradigm" such as 
Alberto Melucci, whose work points towards the need to replace social movement 
activity within the sociocultural contexts from which it proceeds, but who are 
unable to theorise these contexts in their own terms, analysing them only from the 
point of view of their immediate contribution to political activity. Even this 
"culturalist" approach to contemporary movements, then, remains blocked by an 
ultimate prioritisation of instrumental political action, and thus considerably less 
flexible than early cultural studies approaches to class movements.  
This paper argues that social movement activity as currently conceived is only one 
element of broader life-world contexts which need to be theorised on their own 
terms before contemporary movements can be fully understood, and that the modes 
of rationality operative in these contexts have to be seen as an open question for 
research, rather than assumed or imputed. Working with a concept of "counter 
cultures" as historically developed complexes of alternative practices and meanings, 
this paper suggests that both the role of skills and intellectual activity and the 
characteristic modes of organisation of contemporary social movements need to be 
seen in this context. Material from a series of Dublin interviews is used to illustrate 
the possibility that autonomy may be a key element of this life-world rationality. The 
conclusion discusses the political implications of this suggestion.  
 
From social movements to counter cultures:  
steps beyond political reductionism 
Contemporary challenges to the dominant order such as the women's, green and 
peace movements are conventionally treated as the subjects of a "social movements" 
literature [1] which, despite internal divisions, is now widely seen as convergent by 
both supporters and critics (Cohen 1985, Diani 1992, Jones 1993, Maheu 1995). 
This convergence derives from a common problematic which ultimately reduces 
"social movements" to essentially political phenomena, based on the ascription of a 
restricted conception of rationality to the social contexts of movement activity. 
This ascription is legitimated by an implicit reliance on a rationalist methodology, as 
opposed to empiricist and critical realist approaches (McLellan 1981) [2]. Such a 
methodology involves a purely theoretical construction of the nominal subject of 
research. The effect of this is to treat the theorist's own local form of rationality as 
universal, rather than taking the modes of rationality in operation in movement 
contexts as an open question for research. The assumptions of an affirmative 
modernism then confirm the mirror-image arguments of postmodernists in treating 
instrumental rationality as identical with rationality tout court, despite the 
arguments made against this position by Habermas (1987). 
Hence different variants (individual, collective, societal) of instrumental rationality 
are ascribed, unexamined, to these contexts; the result is a political reductionism 
within which only those meanings and practices which correspond to the theorist's 
perception of what is goal-rational are admitted. The "social movements" 
problematic thus focusses on political action in pursuit of seemingly given 
(individual, collective, societal) interests, and treats other forms of activity as a 
priori irrelevant. 
In one perspective, an economistic focus on individual rationality, whether in the 
abstract, as in "resource mobilisation" approaches, or in the context of a "political 
opportunity structure", is the starting-point for analysis of what is described as the 
"how" of social movements. Here instrumental rationality is an explicit 
methodological presupposition (Cohen 1985: 674 - 676). An alternative perspective 
offers a discourse of instrumental rationality at a societal or collective level, either in 
abstract accounts of contemporary society, or in differing forms of class analysis 
(Bagguley 1992: 26 - 38). Here the "why" of social movements appears as what is 
goal-rational for a class or for a society. 
The convergence of these perspectives is then most evident in the shared assumption 
of a goal-rational link between the socially given "interests" of the individuals or 
groups which make up the movements and the action of the movements on the 
polity. This translates into a series of variants of political reductionism, generated 
and held together by a limited concept of rationality. In other words, an author's 
assumptions as to what is rational act to transform a methodological premise into a 
substantive conclusion. The net result of this is that, as one author (Scott 1990: 131) 
declares, "all the essential questions of sociology are nothing other than the 
questions of political science" - or rather, one is reduced to the other. 
The circularities of instrumental rationality 
Alan Scott's recent work Ideology and the new social movements (1990) is a useful 
example of the problems of this approach. He writes, for example, that "Locating 
social movements in terms of social closure ... assumes [my emphasis] that the 
central theme / aim of these movements is integration". This appears both as 
premise and as conclusion (Scott 1990: 136, 152), but no attempt is made to argue 
that this is the meaning of movement action for its actors - a curious position for a 
neo-Weberian. 
Similarly, the claim that "social movements effect change largely through 
influencing existing institutions of political intermediation, particularly political 
parties" depends on a prior reduction of the field of enquiry to "concrete political 
analysis" (Scott 1990: 152, 140), yet this reduction is not itself examined [3]. 
In other words, a rationalist methodology ultimately takes its own presuppositions 
for conclusions. This leads to an unexamined political reductionism, which can be 
exemplified by Scott's empirical research. Here an "examination of [the] main 
ideological strands of 'the new social movements' " is reduced, on the next page and 
without explanation, to an examination of "ecological ideology" alone (1990: 80 - 
81). This is then taken as effectively represented by die Grünen: although the 
relationship between the party and contemporary movements is a well-known 
problem (Raschke 1993: 499 - 528, 682 - 696), Scott simply reduces "the Green 
movement" to the party (1990: 84 - 86) [4]. "Ideology" is then reduced to the 
writings of professional ideologists, again without any examination of this highly 
problematic assumption (Eagleton 1991). Finally, the issue of the representativity of 
these ideologists is left completely examined. 
In fact, of the six figures discussed, only Joschka Fischer has any claim to 
representativity, as a regional boss and faction leader. Of the others, Petra Kelly was 
the only party member in 1990, but her influence within the German party was 
minimal (witness her failure to be reselected, her lack of factional affiliation, and 
her isolation at the time of her death). By the time Scott was writing, Otto Schily had 
joined the SPD; Rudolf Bahro had left the party five (!) years earlier, virtually alone 
(Raschke 1991: 26); to the best of my knowledge Carl Amery has no political 
affiliations (Schäfer 1983: 127); and Herbert Gruhl had spent a decade in the 
political wilderness [5]. Apart from Fischer, the actual ideologists and faction-
leaders - Antje Vollmer, Jutta Ditfurth, Thomas Ebermann Frieder-Otto Wolf, etc. - 
are ignored, as are the communication organs of the movement. 
Thus the argument is circular: the conclusion that "Despite its grass-roots 
democratic principles the European ecology movement has indeed thrown up, and 
often centred around, political celebrities such as Petra Kelly, Otto Schily and 
Joschka Fischer" (Scott 1990: 117) represents simply the assumption that things 
centre around leaders, and that anyone the theorist has heard of must be one. The 
problem of the effectiveness of "grass-roots democracy" rules in weakening 
hierarchy has been the subject of intense discussion among academics and activists 
(Raschke 1991: 80 - 113); but none of this is reflected in Scott. Instead, a rationalist 
methodology ditches sociological problems of method in favour of the "obvious" 
assumptions of the author's own local mode of rationality - at its worst, reducing 
empirical research to what can be found in the university library. 
Problems with political reductionism 
In more formal terms, a rationalist approach involves a confusion between 
methodology and ontology. Weber argued that social scientists construct "ideal-
typical" descriptions of processes in rational terms, but that these are heuristic 
devices, against which actual events must be measured (Weber 1984: 20 - 22, Sadri 
1992: 11 - 22). Much of the literature simply identifies ideal types with reality. 
This rationalist methodology also involves a double short-circuiting of the concept 
of rationality. No justification is given for a presupposition of instrumental 
rationality as the only form of rationality, as opposed to, for example, value 
rationality (Weber 1984: 44 - 46) or communicative rationality (Habermas 1984, 
1987) [6]. Secondly, the assumption that the local contexts of rationality of social 
movement actors and social scientists coincide is simply unexamined. Even 
instrumental rationality, in other words, cannot simply be abstracted from the lived 
contexts within which it may be used. 
The effect of the imputation of instrumental rationality is to reproduce well-known 
problems deriving from a similar approach to "old" social movements, in particular 
the workers' movement. One of the central problems in western Marxism (Jay 1984, 
Gottlieb 1989) over the past seventy years or so has been precisely to explain why 
actors have not behaved in the way that abstractly goal-rational accounts predicted. 
The situation of "social movement" theory is comparable to that of class theory in the 
1950s. It is as if a model of trade unions and corporatism was presented as a 
sufficient theory of social class. The difference is, of course, that class theory moved 
on from that point. In particular, Thompson (1963, 1977, 1993), Hoggart (1958) 
and Williams (1958, 1980) opened up the discussion to include an examination of 
class as lived experience, shared culture and everyday response which goes far 
beyond political economy or institutional analysis to show class as a broad field of 
relationships of conflict, a "whole way of struggle", and not an abstracted logic or a 
specialised set of institutions. 
To pursue the analogy further, while early cultural studies set out to theorise class 
experience, class culture and class action as a whole, social movement theory 
retains a sharp break between a reductionist concept of political action and an 
undertheorised area of "interests" and "identity", thus saddling itself with the 
difficult task of relating "movements", understood as political organisation, to 
"class", understood as given interests (Pakulski 1995). At the same time, this 
reductionist concept of "movement" is to play a major part in understanding 
contemporary society (Giddens 1990, Maheu 1995). The tendency then is to reduce 
society to politics, movements to movement organisations, and sociology to political 
science. 
Trying to break out: Alberto Melucci 
Alberto Melucci's approach begins from a critique of this political reductionism, a 
"myopia of the visible" which "ignores the way in which the visible action of 
contemporary movements depends upon their production of new cultural codes 
within submerged networks" (1989: 44). These networks, he writes, come to 
acquire a life of their own which cannot be reduced to movement mobilisation or its 
impact on the polity: 
"In the 1980s, collective action came to be based on "movement 
areas". These take the form of networks composed of a multiplicity of 
groups that are dispersed, fragmented and submerged in everyday 
life, and which act as cultural laboratories. They require individual 
investments in the experimentation and practice of new cultural 
models, forms of relationships and alternative perceptions and 
meanings of the world. The various groups comprising these 
networks mobilize only periodically in response to specific issues. 
[My emphasis.] The submerged networks function as a system of 
exchanges, in which individuals and information circulate. 
Memberships are multiple and involvement is limited and temporary; 
personal involvement is a condition for participation. The latent 
movement areas create new cultural codes and enable individuals to 
put them into practice." (Melucci 1989: 60) 
This development leads towards "soft" and multiple organisations and a distinction 
between "intense but temporary mobilisations and movement networks that produce 
information, self-reflection and symbolic resources". These networks are 
fundamental for mobilisation: "the potential for resistance ... is located in the 
molecular experience of the individuals or groups who practice the alternative 
meanings of everyday life." (1989: 70 - 71; my emphasis). 
A chance to escape 
This opens up the possibility of shifting the focus from "movements" to "networks", 
which are seen as the ultimate source of movement mobilisations and as more stable 
and continuous than these mobilisations. This would enable a more grounded 
analysis of movements, in which they do not appear as ex nihilo events structured 
by external logics, but as part of a broader life-world with its own specific modes of 
rationality. 
However, this distancing from goal-rational assumptions is not sustained. The 
possibility of shifting to an analysis of networks is apparently recognised, but 
rejected in a curious footnote which appears to be based on the assumption that 
representation prevents fragmentation: Melucci writes that "collective actors are 
prone to disperse, fragmented and atomized, into networks which quickly disappear 
into sects, emotional support circles and therapy groups" (1989: 71-2) [7]. This 
"disappearance" does not seem to be a phenomenological one, but rather a 
disappearance from political relevance because of the lack of an institutional output. 
This can, I think, only be explained by a problematic for which ultimately only 
(institutional) political events are real [8]. 
In other words, Melucci identifies the social basis of contemporary movements, 
notes its logically prior status to the movements themselves, but cannot accept that it 
has an independent existence. Similarly, the possibility of a purely cultural 
challenge is not considered: this despite the statement that (political) movements 
include "symbolic challenges" which lead to "a molecular change which is cultural 
in the anthropological sense: an alteration of daily life, of ways of living and forms 
of social and personal relationships" (1989: 75) [9]. Political movements may carry 
cultural meanings, but the possibility of a purely cultural movement is rejected 
along with the possibility of a direct analysis of "networks" or "movement areas". 
Despite his argument that "[c]onflicts do not chiefly express themselves through 
action designed to achieve outcome in the political system" (1995: 116), Melucci is 
ultimately unable to escape precisely this definition of social movements. 
Within the "social movements" problematic as currently constructed, in other 
words, even the most "culturalist" authors and the most challenging conceptions of 
the social origins of new movements are ultimately contained within what might be 
called the "last instance" priority of instrumental political rationality [10]. The 
"identity-oriented paradigm" (Cohen 1985; Diani 1992) is interested in culture only 
to the extent that it contributes to goal-rational mobilisation; this of course 
subordinates it to the assumptions of the researcher's local mode of rationality. The 
need to transcend this problematic, then, is both a felt need and an unrealised one. 
Beyond the "social movements" problematic 
Melucci's attempt to escape the "social movements" problematic needs to be 
radicalised in two directions. Firstly, an approach which does not assume the 
primacy of state-oriented conflict can start from the analysis of these "movement 
areas" on their own terms. Secondly, the modes of rationality operative in these 
contexts can become an open question for research, in the examination of the 
nature and direction of potential sources of social change. 
Networks, milieux, counter cultures 
A concept close to Melucci's "movement areas" can be found in the work of a group 
of Hannover researchers who have examined the organisation of "new sociocultural 
milieus" as a source of movement activity, bringing together the local history of such 
milieux with accounts of the transformation of habitus within them and relating 
this to changing social structure [11]. Both approaches, however, reproduce a 
misleading distinction between private lifestyles (appearing as resources or 
interests) and public action. 
What is needed instead is to replace those forms of visible public activity within 
these lived contexts: to examine the totality of this "whole way of struggle", without 
presupposing a discontinuity between "collective action" and "the daily production 
of alternative frameworks of meaning" which are said to nourish it (Melucci 1989: 
70). This would then give us a working concept of a counter culture, consisting at 
an ontological level not of formal institutions but rather of interactions between 
individuals affiliated to multiple institutions or to none; these interactions take place 
- networks are mobilised - around "events" of different kinds occurring in what are 
traditionally thought of as different fields - not only political action, but also 
cultural challenges, as well as the logically necessary forms of economic and social 
reproduction. 
Such counter cultures, then, cannot be identified with any of their constituent 
elements; they are constituted by relationships which are activated in a variety of 
different contexts, only some of which fall within the conventional picture of social 
movements. In place of the abstraction of any one of these contexts as defining, 
what has to be done is to examine the actual articulation of meanings and practices 
within these networks or this intersubjectivity [12]. 
Research implications 
The question of local modes of rationality, then, does not start from political 
organisations or the production of cultural artefacts, but from the way in which 
these networks structure daily life: culture in the anthropological sense, including 
alternative forms of economic production and reproduction, means of 
communication, modes of organisation and the forms of consciousness involved in 
all of this, as well as more visible forms of political or cultural contestation [13]. 
This concept of counter cultures as constituted by networks is "weak" by comparison 
with a focus on "groups", whether isolated, face-to-face subcultures or the more 
organised and intentional activity normally examined as "social movements"; it is 
"strong", however, by comparison with perspectives focussed on textual artefacts 
rather than on the creative meanings and practices (including the creative reception 
of such artefacts) in everyday life. 
In terms of sensitising concepts and research techniques, relevant work in this area, 
such as Berger (1981), Sulkunen (1992), the Hannover "new social milieux" group 
(Vester et al. 1993) or Melucci (1989), points towards autonomy and reflexivity as 
possible characteristics of the meanings and practices operative in these contexts. 
The relationship of such cultural codes to "reflexive" and "autonomous" individuals 
is of course a serious problem in itself. Initially, then, research into such locally 
specific modes of rationality involves an examination of (a) alternative meanings 
and practices in general; (b) reflexivity and autonomy within these; and (c) tensions 
between meanings and practices, including individual resistance to generalised 
codes and identities. 
Skills and intellectual activity 
One possible approach to researching modes of rationality is to see them as 
embedded in intellectual activity, which can perhaps be specialised to skills. 
Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) challenging discussion of intellectuals and social 
movements is an important contribution here. However, it represents an unjustified 
narrowing of the concept in relation to Gramsci's theorisation of the problem. 
Firstly, it reduces intellectual activity to the activity of intellectuals. While Gramsci 
argued that "All men [sic] are intellectuals ... but not all men have in society the 
function of intellectuals." (Gramsci 1971: 9), this relates only to professional 
categories: "When one distinguishes between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, one 
is referring in reality only to the immediate social function of the professional 
category of the intellectuals." The proportion of contemporary movement activity 
which is carried out by full-time paid staff, however, is minimal; and once we pass 
from movements to counter cultures this relation is reinforced. What is needed is 
then a theorisation of intellectual activity, not simply of intellectuals. 
Secondly, "intellectual" is reduced to "theoretical", as opposed to "directive" 
(organising) activity, which is central to Gramsci's conception (Vacca 1982). This 
leads to a focus on "cognitive praxis", to the exclusion of the skills of everyday 
organisation and interaction. It is these latter, I would argue, that represent the 
effective "mode of rationality" of a movement or a counter culture: skilled work in 
the construction of practices and meanings: the organisational skills involved in 
participatory decision-making or direct action, the ideological skills needed to 
delegitimise one set of meanings and legitimate another, the creation of an 
infrastructure for communication, economic support, education, the cultural skills 
of tolerating difference and negotiating co-existence, and so on. The apparently 
pragmatic assumptions of counter cultural members then appear as guided by very 
different kinds of experience, and geared to very different kinds of need, than what 
appears as practical in other areas.  
Autonomy in everyday life 
I want to illustrate this with material from research in progress among a network of 
Dublin "hippies", leading lives structured by unemployment, emigration and casual 
labour. While the network extends to many different areas of the counter culture, 
these initial interviews focus on the shared elements of the life-world from which 
visible activities (e.g third world solidarity, green and anarchist politics, alternative 
and amateur publications, street theatre, Rainbow Gatherings, etc.) grow [14]. 
In this context, a goal-rational pursuit of material interests is explicitly contrasted to 
the pursuit of autonomy and self-realisation:  
"It comes back to this idea that the way in which people perceive 
ambition as not a material ambition, which again links back to the 
ideas about people's attitude to property and that. Whilst they have 
fuck all of it, I don't think that is entirely responsible for their 
attitude. The development is sort of personal development, it's not 
material development. So the idea of going away to make money isn't 
really, you're not going to impress anybody, really. 'Oh wow, he's 
earning fuckloads of money, good for him, so what?' " 
Or, more succinctly:  
"Even before I went to college I went 'I want to do a sort of liberal arts 
thing that isn't going to qualify me for one thing'." 
Similarly, the goal-rational pursuit of politics in the narrow sense is rejected in 
favour of autonomy:  
["Groups are bad things?"] "Yeah, kind of limiting. If you try and set 
up anything a lot of these people will just go 'I'm not interested'. You 
know, if they happened to be somewhere and something happened 
they'd go for it, but anything organised they're not interested in, 
anything that sounds remotely political they don't want to know." 
["Why is that?"] "Don't believe in politics, a lot of people just find it 
boring, or completely pointless, or they live their life the way they 
want to and they live and let live, if other people want to get into 
politics. You know, it would kind of be 'if you're into politics that's 
your trip, whereas me, I just want to wander round and play guitar.' " 
Politics, then, takes its place simply as one element of the life-world:  
"Politics is the mechanism by which decisions that affect my life are 
made, therefore if I wish to have any control over my life I must have 
an interest in politics, but it is not the driving force of my life." 
Rather than the imposition of a goal-rational logic from political action on the life-
world, political activity appears as one interest among others, to be handled with 
tolerance:  
"Seán and Muireann didn't ram [anarchist politics] down anybody's 
throat, and nobody tried to make them conform to what was going 
on." 
Tolerance, in fact, appears as a condition of autonomy:  
"There is a sort of laid-back attitude which allows people to do their 
own thing and is very very tolerant of people's individuality and 
people doing their own thing and coming and going as they please." 
Autonomy then finds expression in characteristic forms of interaction:  
"They travel an awful lot, they're obviously, they just don't want a job 
of any kind, they meet an awful lot of people, they hang out on the 
streets an awful lot, play a lot of music, and just do what they do. 
Mostly they're very independent, they don't sort of form a group 
exactly, they just sort of meet up with each other." 
The characteristic modes of rationality of more organised groups can then be related 
to this life-world stress on autonomy. To take some examples more or less at 
random:  
• Earth First!: "Every year the compilation of AU is passed on to another group. 
This is done to maintain new influences, stop burn out of those producing it 
and to prevent any one group becoming 'Earth First! National HQ'." (Anon. 
1996)  
• The (England / Wales) Green Party: "[S]ince we currently have more than 
our fair share of society's rebels, individualists and awkward types, 
consensus has to be a keystone of how we do things." (Wingrove 1996)  
• Friends of the Western Buddhist Order: "The autonomy of each Centre - and 
of any other working unit within the Movement - is a fundamental principle 
of organisation within the FWBO. The major purpose of everything which 
makes up the FWBO is to help people to become individuals." (Subhuti 1988: 
153 - 154)  
In other words, autonomy appears to be a characteristic element of a mode of 
(communicative?) rationality which finds expression in the seemingly pragmatic 
assumptions of a counter cultural life-world, organised as well as disorganised, 
cultural as well as political. From the defence of personal and psychological free 
space and independence, it may develop into a variety of organisational forms (e.g. 
participatory democracy, libertarian anarchy, consensus-based and confederal 
approaches) which contrast sharply with dominant modes of organisation [15]. This 
is then also a reflexive process, in the sense of conscious intervention into group 
self-production; these same organisational forms tend to become ends in themselves 
(as the immediate realisation of autonomy) rather than a means to an end (as in 
goal-rational perspectives). 
Conclusion 
The "social movements" problematic, through the unexamined ascription of 
instrumental rationality, artificially isolates state-oriented political activity from its 
lived context. It thus closes off questions that research into "counter cultures" wishes 
to hold open: the local modes of rationality of these life-world contexts, and the 
place of political or cultural contestation within them. 
The concept of autonomy suggests a new perspective on contemporary difficulties in 
forming alliances between social movements. Conventional accounts which stress 
the homogeneity of the workers' movement as against present diversity (Lash and 
Urry 1987, Buttel 1990) mistake the successful creation of hegemony (Thompson 
1963, Gramsci 1971) and the "closing of modernity" (Wagner 1994) for a "natural" 
uniformity. 
It may be precisely the principled refusal of hegemony and the assertion of 
autonomy as a value in itself - a "post-hierarchical politics" (Boyne 1990) which 
poses the problem - or, more exactly, resistance to the imposition of goal-rational 
forms by actors who value their autonomy. If a resolution is to be found, it must lie 
in the development of non-authoritarian forms of (counter-) hegemony, in other 
words the organisation of consent around a shared project of emancipation and 
tolerance of diversity. Such a project could be grounded in the practices and 
meanings of a shared counter culture (cf. Wainwright 1994, Vester et al. 1993 and 
Seel 1995 for related arguments). The question of whether such an "emancipatory 
hegemony" is possible is, however, not just a theoretical question, but above all a 
practical one. 
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Footnotes 
1. The increasingly artificial distinction between those authors who make use 
of the phrase "new social movements" and those who prefer a different 
language is not employed here. 
2. See Wainwright (1994:100 - 106) for a relevant discussion of critical 
realism in this context. 
3. The earlier concession that "culturalist theories do have a partial explanation 
of social movements['] effects in terms of cultural innovation" (Scott 1990: 
134) vanishes without trace. 
4. An equally unsatisfactory approach is taken by Giddens (1987: 31), who 
discusses the "ecology movement"on the basis of an examination of the 
manifestoes of the European Green Parties, without considering the extent to 
which they represent the actual "ideology" of the parties concerned, let alone 
the movement.  
5. See e.g. Jurtschitsch et al. (1988) for a snapshot of party debate in this 
period. (I spent 1990-91 as a participant observer within die Grünen and 
related contexts.) 
6. Cf. Claus Offe's (1985: 852) argument on the lesser applicability of "the 
economic logic of efficiency" in social contexts marked by 
"decommodification" or Berger, Berger and Kellner's (1974) argument for a 
"demodernising consciousness" in areas outside the central processes of 
economic and political reproduction. 
7. This may derive from one of his criteria for a "social movement", as 
something which "breaks the limits of compatibility of a system" (1989: 29; 
emphasis original). Offe has a similar argument, but explicitly states its 
dependence on political criteria (1985: 826-7).  
8. Political reductionism often depends on a key slippage around the term 
"political" and the concept of power. The valid position that social 
movements pose central questions of power is extended to the unjustified 
assumption that they are primarily about institutionalised politics, in other 
words oriented towards the state. This reduces the concept of power 
unacceptably. Social power relations extend far beyond the confines of the 
state or even formal institutions (Lukes 1971, Rouse 1994); challenges to 
these relations necessarily do likewise. 
9. Raschke (1985: 105 - 116) explicitly argues that movement orientations to 
power or to culture are equally possible: he sees the student movement of the 
1960s and the new social movements as ambivalent in this respect. 
10. A similar logic appears in Touraine (1981). While his analysis of movements 
as the self-creation of class in a struggle for cultural stakes would lend itself 
well to an examination of the non-instrumental elements of movement 
contexts (whatever the other difficulties of this Lukácsian position (Jay 
1984)), in practice he insists on "organised collective behaviour" or 
"organised conflictual action": "an organisation must exist in order for 
conflict to take shape and for the movement to attain a certain integration" 
(1981: 77, 85). 
11. The interim reports (Clemens 1990, Hermann 1990, Geiling 1990, Müller 
1990) are more useful here than the final publication (Vester et al. 1993), 
which is more oriented towards a generalised account of the distribution of 
lifestyles and political behaviour across German society. 
12. I take this to be defensible in terms of Habermas's (1987: 294 - 326) 
response to the structuralist and post-structuralist "death of the subject" in 
terms of a paradigm of intersubjectivity, as well as McRobbie's (1994) 
effectively realist version of postmodernism. 
13. This perspective is developed more fully in Cox (forthcoming).  
14. This is not intended as a formal analysis of local modes of rationality, but 
rather to illustrate the need for such an analysis, as against the simple 
ascription of instrumental rationality. 
15. It can also of course appear as a refusal of definition or as a negative and 
isolating form of "identity politics" (Sawicki 1991). 
 
